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Golden Week Spending, China’s Housing Affordability Push, EU Trade, Manus After Meta, and the AI Access Fight - Baiguan Radio #44
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Golden Week Spending, China’s Housing Affordability Push, EU Trade, Manus After Meta, and the AI Access Fight - Baiguan Radio #44

Episode in brief

  • Golden Week was healthier than the headlines. Total trips and spending both rose. Only spending per trip fell, by about 2%. Robert reads that as money spreading to smaller towns and to services, not as weak demand.

  • Beijing is working on the monthly payment, not the price. A central-government mortgage interest subsidy for some first-time buyers is, in Robert’s view, a more important housing measure than the market has noticed. He cites Baiguan data showing a pickup in secondary-market transactions, but new-home sales are not benefiting.

  • The EU-China car arrangement is, in Robert’s reading, more theater than substance. The “cut by half” is measured against an EU projection, so actual exports can still grow, and both sides can claim a win.

  • The Manus outcome supports a less alarmist reading of Beijing. Robert argues the unwinding of the Meta deal was a reasonable use of existing review powers, and the company’s first independent funding round shows it is still allowed to grow.

  • Consumer AI in China is held back by platform access, not model quality. More than 150 apps have reportedly blocked a ByteDance AI assistant from operating them, which fits Robert’s view that the large platforms are fighting over who controls the interface.

Golden Week: Consumers Pay for Experience, and Spending Spreads Out

Outbound travel is back, and shopping is no longer the reason

Olivia opened with an observation from Kenya. At a national park that takes roughly a five-hour drive from Nairobi on rough roads, she found most safari vehicles full of young Chinese tourists, apparently travelling independently rather than in tour groups. Robert said his parents saw the same in Norway and Iceland and described a return to the post-Covid pattern of Chinese tourists “taking over the world.” He added a base-effect point: with China’s population so large, even 10% to 20% growth in outbound travel means millions more people.

Both hosts tied this to a shift from shopping trips to experience trips. Robert pointed to a big Louis Vuitton venue in Shanghai that he doubts has an equivalent in Paris, and argued that China already offers plenty of shopping, so it is no longer a reason to fly. The same logic applies at home. He says domestic travellers increasingly choose smaller, cheaper, less crowded and less famous places over landmarks such as the Oriental Pearl Tower or the Forbidden City, which he describes as a past era of travelling mainly to bring home a photo.

How negative are the spending numbers?

Olivia cited figures from Baiguan’s Golden Week recap and noted that many headlines she saw about the holiday were negative because spending per trip fell. She added three offsetting factors: a longer holiday, more outbound trips, and more travel to lower-tier cities where money goes further.

Robert said he was surprised anyone read the data as negative. Total trips and total spending rose, and the one weak reading, spending per trip, is consistent with more people travelling to cheaper places. He sees the dispersal of tourist money across the country as a positive that lays foundations for future growth there.

Services growth, and why film is the wrong proxy

Olivia pointed to the services categories as the bright spot and linked them to the government’s stated aim of expanding services consumption. Robert agreed and addressed the usual counterexample, cinema. He argues box-office weakness reflects a global decline in cinema-going that China shares, so it is a poor proxy for Chinese service demand. He also makes a distributional argument: services are delivered by people, and per-capita income in services tends to be higher than in goods industries, so service growth helps spread wealth and supports further consumption.

Participatory film sets as an early signal

The hosts discussed a format highlighted in Baiguan’s recap: at China’s largest film and television shooting base, in Zhejiang, tourists can pay several hundred RMB to play the lead in a short drama. Robert described a friend of a friend, previously in real estate, who is trying to convert a defunct commercial property into live movie sets with supporting actors for around 100 RMB per experience.

Implication. Spending per trip is a weak standalone indicator. The episode points to trip volume, geographic spread and services categories such as sports and culture as the better gauges of where consumption is heading. Robert’s caution about the film-set business model is a reminder that the format is unproven commercially.

Read more on Golden Week consumption here:

Investment

What China's 2026 “Golden Week” Consumption Reveals — Charts of the Week

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Oct 13
What China's 2026 “Golden Week” Consumption Reveals — Charts of the Week

“Charts of the Week” is Baiguan’s series that features key data points to help you quickly grasp the general state of affairs in China in just a few minutes. We handpick the highlights of the data charts from a variety of sources, analyzing and delivering insights

Housing: Beijing Targets the Monthly Payment

The measures

Olivia framed housing as the main drag on consumer confidence and cited S&P Global Ratings, reported by CNBC, saying China’s property market is nearing a bottom based on comparisons with other countries. She described two recent measures. In August, Beijing tightened rules on selling unfinished homes. More recently, it announced that it will pay part of the mortgage interest for some first-time buyers of homes under 1.5 million RMB (about 220,000 USD) and under 120 square meters (about 1,300 square feet).

Robert’s argument: affordability, not price

Robert says this is one of the more impactful of a long string of incremental housing policies and that the market is not paying enough attention to it. The subsidy is only around 1% of a property’s value, which looks too small to matter. But he argues buyers think in monthly flows, comparing the mortgage payment with income, not in total price. It is also unusual for the central government to commit its own finances.

His case rests on affordability measured in years of income. At the peak, he says, an average Shanghai apartment took almost 30 to 40 years of income, and 10 to 15 years in some smaller cities. Since then prices have fallen 30% to 50% or more in some places, interest rates have dropped, and the subsidy lowers the effective rate further, to around 2% for some buyers. Total personal income has risen over the same period, although people are saving more than they consume. He says some estimates put the improvement in affordability at as much as three times, for example in Shanghai.

“You are paying less on a monthly basis for something that has less value with a higher income, which means the affordability of housing has gone up.”

Robert Wu

Robert reads current policy as a deliberate effort to keep pushing that affordability measure lower. His forecast is that the cycle ends when buying becomes obvious to the average buyer, for example when a mortgage takes about a third of income.

What the early data show, and where the policy does not reach

Citing Baiguan’s own data, Robert says secondary-market transactions in major cities such as Shanghai have grown about 20 times year on year since the subsidy was announced. Prices have not risen, and buyers are taking longer to negotiate and view more properties, but volumes are up. New-home sales are not benefiting because the policy targets smaller, cheaper homes, which are mostly in the secondary market, while new-build supply skews upscale.

Why Beijing, and why now

Robert argues that housing was historically a local-government responsibility, including construction, permits and market health, and that people have long urged Beijing to take more of it on. He sees early signs that it now is, which in his view means it can do more. On timing, he says conditions keep worsening and that people compare the present with 2024, before the September policy pivot. He thinks the country is not back there yet, but that policy is being applied pre-emptively. If the measure does not work, he expects the central government still has tools to push affordability further. This is a forecast, not an announced plan.

He also tied the policy to broader consumption. Home purchases generate demand for renovation, furniture and appliances, and sellers receive cash to spend or reinvest. First-time buyers typically buy to start families. Olivia noted Shanghai’s recent childbirth support, which Robert characterized as essentially making childbirth free. He speculated that education and daycare could follow but said he did not know. He also relayed that officials at local tourism boards told him boosting consumption is now one of their KPIs, a responsibility that once sat with the commerce department and is now shared across departments.

Asked whether central involvement carries risk, Robert said Beijing has historically been financially conservative and cautious about setting precedents, so its use of its own money here is significant.

EU and China: A Car Deal Both Sides Can Claim

China’s trade surplus with the EU was reported in September to have hit a record high, cited at around 34.8 billion USD, and Chinese exports to the EU reportedly tripled year on year in the first half of 2026 to more than 7.5 billion USD, with cars among the largest categories. The recording does not make clear the period for the surplus figure or the category for the export figure. The two sides reportedly reached what she called a “shared understanding” to moderate Chinese exports of hybrids and plug-in hybrids, potentially cutting projected shipments by more than half over four years and keeping several million vehicles out of the bloc. Exactly what was agreed remains murky.

Robert’s main takeaway is that neither side wants a trade war now, and that neither could win one. China, he says, believes it holds the stronger hand, while the EU does not want to accept it is the weaker party. He reads the outcome as theatrics. The EU Trade Commissioner’s language about cutting exports by half turns out to be measured against the EU’s own projection of Chinese exports. Exports could therefore keep growing even after the “cut,” and a projection of something that has not happened is subjective. That lets the EU claim a cut and China claim growth.

“It’s more about the policy and looking good to their domestic constituencies rather than actual substance.”

Robert Wu

Robert sees the underlying issue as competitiveness and expects the tension to return. Asked whether markets are waiting on the US trade fight or the US midterms, he agreed but said the number of variables has grown, citing the war in Iran and the war in Ukraine, and said following the news in 2026 is very different from following it in 2006.

Manus: Beijing’s Intervention Looks Different After the Funding Round

What happened

Manus launched its autonomous agent in early 2025, which drew major attention at the time. In December 2025 Meta agreed to acquire it for around 2 billion USD. Chinese regulators cited national security concerns and ordered the parties to unwind the deal, and Manus resumed independent operations in August 2026. It has now raised its first round as an independent company, co-led by Boyu Capital, IDG Capital and Tencent.

Robert’s reading: Beijing acted within its rules

Robert says most observers fall into one of two camps: that Beijing is hostile to private business and cracking down arbitrarily, or that it has a legitimate point. He places himself in the second camp and says he was among a few lone voices at the time. His argument has four parts. First, a Chinese company acquired by a foreign buyer is normally subject to approvals, much as the US reviews foreign purchases through CFIUS. Second, Manus changed its identity from a Chinese company to a Singaporean one, which he calls “Singapore washing.” By his account this happened around August or September of 2025, a few months before the deal, and he does not think the founders had the sale in mind then. Third, the founders and their investors were outspoken after the sale about how smart they had been. Fourth, Beijing could not stay silent without inviting other companies to copy the approach.

The outcome, in his view, is evidence for his reading. Those in the first camp would have predicted arrests or fines. Instead, the founders were summoned to China from Singapore, the deal was unwound, and the company was allowed to continue and raise money. Robert says he has heard it is also allowed to pursue a Hong Kong IPO provided it follows the rules. That is secondhand and unconfirmed.

Olivia asked about comparisons to the Jack Ma episode. Robert said Beijing was also reasonable in that case, in his view, but that its slow and poor communication with foreign audiences damaged its position. He thinks Beijing has since learned from that, while accepting that it can be put in a bad light even when acting reasonably.

Outlook

Robert says any IPO decision, whether in 2027 or later, will rest mainly with management and market timing, not the government. He stressed that Manus’s business is uncertain, because its early novelty has been overtaken by a crowded field of agents. His best guess is that the company remains global, with US dollar investment, and that Hong Kong is the likely listing venue. He notes that the lead investors are at least Beijing-friendly investors and corporates.

Consumer AI: The Fight Over Who Controls Access

More than 150 mobile apps, including WeChat and Taobao, have reportedly opted out of letting a ByteDance AI smartphone assistant operate them autonomously. The assistant is transcribed as “Dobell” and is probably Doubao, which needs confirming.

Robert used it to make a broader point. In his view AI is already advanced enough, and what holds it back from daily life is mundane and institutional: the large platforms control the data and the interfaces, and they are negotiating and fighting over access because he expects the outcome to be winner-take-all. He gave the example that he cannot have an AI assistant analyze his WeChat conversations because the platform does not open the door. Consumers want an assistant that can order from Meituan or Luckin Coffee, which sounds simple but cannot be done. He does not know what will trigger the breakthrough and suggested it may not come from the current generation of internet companies. He treats the ByteDance product as one of many attempts to build an AI interface that consumers adopt. As a workaround, he has been exporting about 100 WeChat chats at a time to email and handing them to AI.

“There are a lot of things that consumers want to do. They cannot, not because AI is not smart enough. It’s very smart. It’s because AI doesn’t have the data, doesn’t have the access, doesn’t have the APIs.”

Robert Wu

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